fisheries governance

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Beyond the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Agreement: a New Policy Brief Compendium.

In 2023, the Mercatus Center (George Mason University, in Virginia) and the Center for Governance and Markets (University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) hosted a joint roundtable event dedicated to addressing persistent problems in global overfishing. The inspiration behind the event had been the launch of the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which provided the unifying thread for a series of discussions by several experts across different fields. The roundtable took place in Pittsburgh in the Summer, and preceded a number of written contributions that were subsequently published as part of a compendium of Policy Briefs hosted by the Mercatus Centre, all of which are accessible here. 

The purpose of the compendium is to explore solutions for enduring global problems involving overfishing and illegal fishing, and to inform the debate on fisheries subsidies, as well as related issues, as they are periodically debated under the auspices of the WTO and other economic and policy fora. Christine McDaniel and Ilia Murtazashvili, respectively of the Mercatus Centre and the University of Pittsburgh, have recently published a very useful paper with a summary of the topics that have been covered by all Policy Briefs in the compendium, which can be accessed here. As can be seen from the references to the topics covered by the different authors, concerns are varied and include implementation issues (particularly in the context of indigenous and small-scale fisheries) as well as agreement weaknesses and loopholes, and insight into the governance of fisheries resources as a shared concern of the global community.

A summary of all the contributions as well as links to each individual paper is kindly provided by the authors for ease of reference. My own contribution to the compendium, named ‘Can the WTO Help Fight IUU Fishing through Clarity-Enhancing Market Measures?’ can be accessed here. I hope you find this and other contributions interesting and useful.

With very best wishes for the New Year

Mercedes

Image credit: Juan Vilata

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Vagabond Science: a discussion about fishing

Earlier this year I met with Matt Lanagan of Vagabond Science, who had a few questions about the way that marine fisheries are managed around the world. Guided by his questions, we discussed wide ranging topics, from apex predators, to fisheries collapse, and all sorts of law, policy, enforcement, technology and other things in between.

Matt recorded our conversation, which available on YouTube and most podcast platforms, and has kindly given me permission to reproduce it here. I hope some of our readers will find it interesting.

Best wishes

Mercedes

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Innovating for change in global fisheries governance

Time flies! It will be seven years ago in September that I had the pleasure of co-organising the first ‘Innovating for change in global fisheries governance’ workshop alongside Drs. Eva van der Marel and Camille Goodman. That first workshop brought together PhD students (as indeed the three of us were at the time), early career scholars, and established academics, and resulted in the publication of a special issue in Marine Policy, edited by Eva van der Marel, Richard Caddell, and Elise Johansen, which can be accessed here.

This year, Eva, Camille, and I have again joined forces to plan a follow-up. We would like to make this new workshop as accessible and as trans-disciplinary as possible, and so we would like to encourage new and established academics as well as PhD students from a broad range of disciplines to apply. The aim is to identify, explore, and discuss recent legal, political, economic, technical, technological, and scientific developments in fisheries governance, always with an eye on scoping solutions for existing problems, and positive developments that take us closer to sustainable fisheries anywhere in the world.

The workshop is being organised around the following 4 topic categories:

  • Innovation in relation to environmental challenges (e.g. relationship between fisheries and climate change, pollution, etc.)
  • Innovation in relation to technical challenges (e.g. vessel/gear technologies, standards, data collection, and monitoring & enforcement)
  • Innovation in relation to human challenges (e.g. vulnerable human groups, equitable approaches, and small-scale fisheries)
  • Innovation in relation to new legal developments (e.g. the BBNJ treaty).

The workshop will take place at the Norwegian Centre for the Law of the Sea (NCLOS), Tromsø, on the 14th and 15th of September this year. If you are interested in attending, please send an abstract of your paper and a short biography (not exceeding 2 pages in total) to Eva (eva.v.marel@uit.no). Full details here: https://uit.no/tavla/artikkel/808758/innovating_for_change_in_global_fisheries_governa

The deadline for submissions is the end of May. We’ll look forward to seeing you there!

Mercedes Rosello, Leeds, 2023

Image credit: NCLOS.
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A new IUU fishing control tool for flag states

Pew has published a Flag State Performance Assessment tool this month. The main aim of this new instrument is to help flag States self-assess their domestic legal frameworks so that they can identify strengths and weaknesses in their law and policy frameworks to regulate the activities of fishing vessels in the high seas and in the exclusive economic zones of other States. The tool enables users to identify and map certain rules and processes that, together, enable and help support and shape the powers and actions of flag state authorities, especially those that need a clear and comprehensive legal basis, such as those related to the oversight of fishing activity.

The tool comes in the form of a questionnaire, which is divided into six modules, which contain a range of performance indicators in respect of different fishing vessel governance categories. The modules are: Registration and Due Diligence, Authorisation and Licensing, Catch and Operation Reporting, Monitoring Control and Surveillance, Infractions and Sanctions, and International Cooperation). It can be used with or without a simple weighting method to enable comparison and measure progress through periodical assessments. The questionnaire can be accessed and downloaded through Pew’s website: https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2023/04/new-flag-state-performance-assessment-tool-aims-to-help-countries-combat-illegal-fishing

Beyond its main function of enabling the identification of specific IUU fishing control performance indicators, the questionnaire also has the potential to support flag States in strengthening their efforts to combat IUU fishing in a number of ways. Firstly, as the questionnaire has been developed on the basis of global international treaties and voluntary instruments, it can support the implementation of existing international rules and guidelines. It also enables mapping of the existing domestic rule framework and of changes occurring over time, and supports periodical re-assessments in a way that is objective and methodical, and can help promote legal accessibility and certainty. Some parts of the questionnaire are also designed to strengthen transparency in the domestic IUU control system and to help build cooperation procedures and practices, both domestically and internationally.

The questionnaire is not, and should not be seen as, a silver bullet to remedy weaknesses and failures to control IUU fishing, and in particular it will not be able to replace the political will and financial and technological investment that many states need to become truly effective distant water vessel governance actors. Nevertheless, it should assist in ensuring that key legal building blocks for such endeavour are in place. It is often an overlooked fact that national authorities depend on adequate legal bases to be able to exercise powers, particularly when it comes to surveillance and sanctioning, without which IUU fishing control can simply not take place.

At the same time, national legal frameworks for IUU fishing control also need specific rules that bind individuals and companies to certain obligations, as well as certain protections. With this in mind, the questionnaire contains several indicator categories that are present in each module. One of the categories relates to the powers and obligations of state authorities, and another one to the obligations and rights of individuals and companies. The third one refers to procedural indicators with a function of enhancing transparency through information and rule accessibility and enhanced legal certainty.

Although ideally the questionnaire should be used internally by the authorities of flag States wishing to improve their IUU fishing control performance, it can also be downloaded and used by independent third parties- interested in engaging in the assessment. Nevertheless, the breadth of rules and processes that the questionnaire covers makes it likely that some form of flag State assistance might be required in fully scoping existing national laws and regulations.

This instrument has benefitted from input by many experts from academia, industry, and government throughout its long development. I have had the privilege of assisting with its elaboration and having seen its evolution, maturation, and testing, I very much hope that it will serve to strengthen flag State regulation, and enhance key information and procedural transparency in the areas where it is most needed.

Mercedes Rosello, Leeds, 2023.

Photo credit: House of Ocean
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Lack of Transparency: the Achilles Heel in IUU Fishing Control

 

Who Fishes Far recently announced the availability of new information through their pioneering database, which represents an unprecedented achievement in affording visibility to information that is rarely accessible to the public.

The announcement, which can be accessed here, warns of gaps in the information. Amongst these, the ongoing lack of availability of a unique vessel identification number is highlighted as being of concern, despite the fact that European vessels have an authorisation number. The reason for this is that there is a recognised need for a global tool for the identification of vessels across all registries and ports. This deficiency has been of widespread concern in the sector, and has been discussed extensively in the global forum of the FAO.

IUU fishing success depends upon opacity

The absence of this vessel identification number across the spectrum of ocean-going fishing and support vessels is important, because vessels flagged not just to European member states, but to the majority of distant water fishing states, are not constrained to perpetually operate under the same flag. Owners are able to re-register vessels to other flags in pursuit of commercial or practical preferences. Through this re-registration process, the traceability of a vessel’s identity can easily be lost, and a unique vessel identifier, such as the universally acknowledged IMO number, may be the only element of permanence in what may otherwise be an unrecognisable ship.

It is clear from Interpol’s purple notices amongst other sources that a recurrent modus operandi of vessels engaged in IUU fishing operations that the masking of a vessel’s identity, nationality and history by way of frequent re-flagging is a persistent strategy adopted by IUU operators. Yet states that ostensibly subscribe to all the major international treaties on fisheries conservation and management persistently decline to make essential vessel information available and verifiable.

For instance, clear registration procedures, the identity of their vessels and specification of licence conditions is rarely accessible even though disclosing this information is in principle cost-neutral. An unfortunate recent example is the case of Thunder, a known IUU vessel whose registration and licensing status by Nigeria has never been fully disclosed.

Image Credit: Sea Shepherd Global

Image Credit: Sea Shepherd Global

Insufficient progress despite key importance of transparency

The potential and specifics of a global record of fishing and supply vessels and reefers has been repeatedly discussed by COFI, whose strategy document makes clear that a globally adopted system of vessel identification would form the lynchpin in the convergence of IUU fishing control data-sharing, and in the coordination of regional and global control regimes. This includes the much hoped for operational success of the 2009 Port State Measures Agreement, which came into force this month, and which relies for functionality on the disclosure and availability to port authorities of key data involving vessel identity and authorisations.

In addition to vessel identification numbers, the importance of minimum standards for vessel registration procedures and their public availability for vessel verification purposes cannot be overstated: vessel registration provides a mechanism for identity traceability that can easily be lost if minimum standards, such as those set out in the 2014 Voluntary Guidelines for Flag State Performance, are not followed with rigour. The accessibility of this information in order to verify vessel identity claims should be a key feature of any public vessel register, yet it is undermined by pervasive opacity.

Conclusion

Lack of transparency is the metaphorical Achilles heel of IUU fishing control, but it is in the power of flag, coastal and port States to ensure certain key disclosures, such as vessel identity and licensing data, are made and maintained. Given that the nature of this information is commercially non-sensitive, there seems to be little justification for refusing to disclose such data.

International legislation on IUU fishing control, from the 2001 International Plan of Action, to the IUU Regulation and the Port State Measures Agreement, has been constructed around the central role of the vessel in activities that can be classed as illegal, unreported and/or unregulated. Yet, an unidentifiable vessel is just an additional shield protecting the perpetrators.

Clearly, leadership initiatives by civil society have an important role to play, but the leverage potential of international markets should also be articulated to promote transparency. There should be little patience with current hesitancy, given that the stakes have never been higher.

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Operation Sparrow brings an important message to the fight against IUU fishing

Awareness that cooperation is key for the successful governance of wild fisheries has increased exponentially in recent decades, and European Council Regulation 1005/2008, also known as the EU IUU Regulation, has been instrumental in fostering and incentivising such cooperation.

The IUU Regulation is Europe’s flagship law for the identification and control of IUU activities, products and interests. Crucially, the IUU Regulation includes measures to address a difficult issue: the participation of European interests in IUU fishing, including those conducted with vessels registered outside the EU.[1]

Illegal Fishing

Credit: European Commission.

Adaptive legislative measures were taken in Spain in 2014 in response to the requirements of the Regulation.[2] This has permitted the Spanish government to undertake a series of operations aimed at addressing the suspected involvement of nationals in IUU fishing schemes involving three vessels: Kunlun, Yongding and Songhua.[3] All three had been documented conducting unauthorised fishing activities in waters regulated by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).[4]

Three of the operations launched by Spain, Sparrow, Sparrow II and the latest, Banderas, are of an administrative character. A fourth, operation Yuyus, has been developed under the auspices of Spain’s National Criminal Court. These operations, coordinated with the assistance of Interpol, bring together the goodwill and expertise of several other countries, including Belize, New Zealand, Australia and Cape Verde, as well as public and non-public actors including NGOs.

The launch of the first of such operations, Sparrow, by Spanish Ministry of Agriculture and Environment, MAGRAMA, led to the announcement of unprecedented fines in respect of IUU fishing activities by Spanish persons in Antarctica.[5] The administrative process, now drawn to a close, has resulted in combined penalties of €17,840,000 being formally imposed on several Spanish companies, namely Vidal Armadores, Viarsa Energía, Viarsa Cartera, Primary Capital, Alimenta Corporación, Alimenta Túnidos, Gallega de Pesca Sostenible, Propegarvi, y Proyectos y Desarrollos Renovables as well as seven individuals.[6] The financial penalties include sanctions for obstructing the work of officials and destroying documents during the investigations. In addition to sanctions of a financial nature, prohibitions to carry out fishing activities spanning between 5 and 23 years, and prohibitions to request public funds in connection with fishing activities spanning between 5 and 26 years have also been imposed.[7]

redesybarcos1_tcm7-415210_noticia

Credit: MAGRAMA

With this announcement, MAGRAMA has drawn Operation Sparrow to its intended conclusion.[8] Meanwhile, MAGRAMA has dealt another blow in the fight against IUU fishing, as vessels Northern Warrior and Antony, both linked to finding under Sparrow II, were seized in the port of Vigo on Friday 18th March as part of MAGRAMA’s Operation Banderas.[9] It has been reported that persons responsible for the operation of the vessels relied on forged documentation to access the port, and that forgeries had also been used to obtain fishing authorisations in the course of 2015. The vessels, which appear to be currently stateless, are being held subject to the payment of bonds of over € 1 Million.[10]

In parallel with the above operations, a separate criminal investigation has also been under way for the past few months.[11] This investigation, named Yuyus by reference to IUU fishing, concerns suspected activities that are classified as infractions of Spanish penal law. Months of investigative work by operatives of the Spanish Guardia Civil and Interpol culminated on Monday the 14th, when down raids carried out on properties linked with the Vidal family resulted in the arrest and incarceration of six individuals who were later released on bail.[12] It has been widely reported that the infractions leading to the criminal charges would concern activities such as integration in a criminal organisation, money laundering, fraud, and unspecified activities amounting to environmental crimes recognised by Spanish law.[13]

Spain’s Minister for Agriculture, Food and Environment, Isabel Garcia Tejerina, has publicly congratulated MAGRAMA’s Fisheries Directorate General for their accomplishments, and highlighted the reception by the Directorate General of an ISO 9001/2015 certification in recognition of Spain’s quality management systems in respect of fisheries control. [14] This recognition confirms Spain’s leading role in the control of IUU fishing activities in Europe and abroad. [15]

igt01_tcm7-415248_noticia

Spanish Minister Isabel Garcia Tejerina. Credit: MAGRAMA

The importance of Operation Sparrow does not lay only in the highly symbolic nature of its ambitious objective: to disable some of the most persistent and high profile transgressions against fisheries conservation. Time only will tell if Sparrow has been able to deliver its intended coup de grace. However, Sparrow sets a precedent that must also be framed against the background of the EU IUU Regulation: the law requires an unwavering commitment by EU member States not only for its effectiveness, but also for the establishment and development of credible long term internal and extraterritorial standards of cooperation. The extraordinary complexity of operations Sparrow, Sparrow II, Banderas and Yuyus, which have variously been assisted by at least fourteen countries,[16] underlines the essential role that international cooperation and sound legal frameworks play in the fight against IUU fishing.

Efforts to bring fairness and sustainability to the sector may be far from over. However, the extraordinary events of the past few months serve to remind all those invested in the fight against IUU fishing that this is a fight that must and can be won.

REFERENCES

[1] The full text of the Regulation can be accessed via http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32008R1005

[2] http://www.magrama.gob.es/es/prensa/noticias/-la-reforma-de-la-ley-de-pesca-mar%C3%ADtima-del-estado-fortalece-el-futuro-del-sector-pesquero-y-acu%C3%ADcola-español-/tcm7-358461-16

[3] http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2015/N2015-003

[4] https://www.ccamlr.org

[5] As reported on IUU Watch on December the 24th 2015: http://www.iuuwatch.eu/2015/12/operation-sparrow-a-landmark-in-the-fight-against-iuu-fishing/

[6] http://www.magrama.gob.es/es/prensa/noticias/la-resolución-del-expediente-de-la-operación-sparrow-sanciona-a-9-empresas-y-7-personas-f%C3%ADsicas-por-su-implicación-en-la-actividad-de–buques-qu/tcm7-415229-16

[7] http://www.magrama.gob.es/es/prensa/noticias/la-resolución-del-expediente-de-la-operación-sparrow-sanciona-a-9-empresas-y-7-personas-f%C3%ADsicas-por-su-implicación-en-la-actividad-de–buques-qu/tcm7-415229-16

[8] It is at present unclear whether the vessels Songua, Yongding and Kunlun, or any property of the sanctioned companies or individuals has been impounded.

[9] http://www.magrama.gob.es/es/prensa/noticias/el-ministerio-de-agricultura-alimentación-y-medio-ambiente-retiene-a-dos-buques-por-la-posible-comisión-de-infracciones-muy-graves-relacionadas-/tcm7-415451-16

[10] Ibid

[11] Audiencia Nacional: http://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Poder-Judicial/Audiencia-Nacional/

[12] http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/maritima/2016/03/08/detenidos-pesca-ilegal-antartida-cuatro-miembros-vidal-armadores/0003_201603G8P31994.htm

[13] http://www.elmundo.es/cronica/2016/03/14/56e3f37546163f3e638b4588.html

[14] http://www.magrama.gob.es/es/prensa/noticias/garc%C3%ADa-tejerina-españa-es-l%C3%ADder-indiscutible-y-un-referente-a-nivel-mundial-en-el-control-e-inspección-pesquera–/tcm7-415092-16

[15] http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=62085

[16] http://www.fishnewseu.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15038:the-tooth-the-whole-tooth-and-nothing-but-the-tooth&catid=46:world

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Illegal Fishing of Swordfish Highlights Weaknesses in IUU Control Mechanisms

Illegal Fishing of Swordfish Highlights Weaknesses in IUU Control Mechanisms

Swordfish has been in the limelight this year, not less because of the recent ban handed by the EU to Sri Lanka, a swordfish exporter to European markets. The ban is likely to be implemented in early 2015 and will close the Union’s doors to a substantial volume of seafood. According to the European Commission, Sri Lankan seafood imports into the Union border 7,400 tonnes, with an approximate value of €74 Million. A significant part of this volume is swordfish.

A swift review of recent months’ media reports suggests that this ban may not be enough to significantly curb overfishing of this iconic commercial species.

In June this year, Oceana Europe revealed evidence of extensive illegal swordfish driftnetting operations in Moroccan Waters. The fish was being introduced into Europe for final consumer sale in Italy, where it is a highly prized food. The unlawful use of driftnets in Italy has been regularly highlighted by European NGO Blackfish in recent years. Drifnets have been subjected to a United Nations moratorium and are banned in Mediterranean waters by the regional regulatory body, ICCAT due to their destructive and indiscriminate nature.

Swordfish (xiphias gladius). Photo Credit: Sue Flood, naturepl.com

Photo Credit: Sue Flood

Eradicating the use of driftnets in the Mediterranean is proving to be a difficult task, no less because the deployment of this indiscriminate fishing art is as difficult to detect as is obtaining hard evidence of its systematic use.

Under the regime established by European Council Regulation 1005/2008 (the IUU Regulation) most seafood imports must be accompanied by a ‘catch’ certificate. This certificate has to be validated by the authorities in the country responsible for regulating the capture of the fish. However, the catch certificate does not include a declaration on the type of gear used during the fishing operations and consequently, it is not possible for European authorities to decline a landing simply on the basis of a fraudulent declaration on the certificate. A request to declare gear type on the certificate could raise the level of due diligence being exercised by fishing authorities such as Morocco, a long standing partner of the EU in the context of fisheries, and in whose waters Oceana discovered the driftnetting operation.

Also this year, the Spanish Directorate General for Fisheries raised a warning about unusually high volumes of swordfish being sold into Europe through Spanish borders, originating from Vietnamese and Indonesian fishing vessels. Having temporarily suspended Vietnamese imports, the Spanish authorities have requested the Commission’s intervention.

This event has highlighted another tear in the European illegal fishing control system, which appears to lack a mechanism to ensure collection and coordination of species-specific import data. This affects the EU’s ability to detect instances where particular species captured by third countries are imported into the EU in excess of regulatory quotas.

Countries who are members or who cooperate with Regional Fishery Management Organisations (RFMOs), the organisations who govern the fishing of swordfish and other commercial species in specific ocean regions, must declare the level of their captures. Failure to cooperate with RFMOs is classed as either “unregulated” or “unreported” fishing by the United Nation’s Fish Stocks Agreement and classed as IUU by the IUU Regulation.

Incidents like these suggest that systemic response mechanisms to under-declaration of quota to RFMOS are sluggish and patchy. Vietnam and Indonesia export substantial amounts of swordfish and other seafood products to international markets including the EU and the US. Whilst international cooperation is paramount in ensuring that minimum IUU control standards are implemented internationally, relatively straightforward improvements to our existing IUU control systems could also make a valuable contribution in increasing transparency and efficiency.

Sources:

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-584_en.htm

Click to access Italian_Driftnets.pdf

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:286:0001:0032:EN:PDF#page=27

Spain seeks EU-wide suspension of Vietnamese swordfish imports


http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/274/67/PDF/N9527467.pdf?OpenElement

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Illegal Fishing Control: Why Europe Needs a Common Software Platform

Council Regulation 1005 / 2008 (the IUU Regulation) is a European Union (EU) legislative tool designed to reinforce and support pre-existing normative measures established by the international community to control illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

 

Transhipment, Central Pacific (Image Credit: underwatertimes.com)

The potential of the IUU regulation to disincentivise IUU fishing practices gravitates around

  • the indisputable power of the EU as port and market State, and
  • on the ability of the EU to implement the IUU regulation in an even and watertight manner.

These are in fact like two sides of the same coin, since loopholes in implementation leading to IUU importation windows can de facto give rise to different standards within the common trade boundary and make coordination impossible.

A recent report offers an insight into progress made in implementing the Regulation, which came into force on the 1st of January 2010.[1] The report offers a useful overview of the different degrees of investment, reorganisation and resource reallocation in each of the Member States pursuant to the requirements of the IUU Regulation.

According to the authors, the catch certification system imposed by the Regulation has placed a heavy administrative burden on Member States. Implementation has been uneven and differences in approach cannot always be attributed to differences in patterns such as seafood trade volume, financial resilience or pre-existing know-how: Whilst large importers such as Denmark and Spain have developed interactive IU tools, others (including some with considerable importation volumes) have not done so. The same is true of intelligence data gathering processes.

For example, highly sophisticated IUU tracking software and data capture systems in Spain have not been replicated (and are not supported) in other Member States. This unevenness in the implementation of the Regulation leads to inefficiencies, penalises better implementation and causes potential diversions of legitimate trade.

Increased data and know-how sharing can address other weaknesses of the IUU Regulation such as the inability of the imports system to deter the duplication of catch certificates during processing operations in 3rd countries.[2] Increased knowledge and sharing of processing methodologies and conversion data could help address this issue.

As no common IT platform exists with the capability to cross-check import volumes, sources, fishing arts, time of capture and composition, States are rendered powerless to flag suspected IUU imports in a timely fashion.

This problem became manifest earlier this year when the Spanish government decided to suspend the importation of Vietnamese swordfish over IUU concerns.[3] According to Madrid sources, an audit identified a volume of 502 metric tonnes (mt) of swordfish captured in 2012 by Vietnamese vessels (according to catch certificate data) being imported into Spain despite Vietnam having declared to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries total capture volumes of only 372 mt for that time period. Vietnam exports swordfish to other European countries, but the capture declaration shortfall had not been identified in any other Member States.

Swordfish (xiphias gladius). Image Credit: fisherynation.com

Swordfish (xiphias gladius). Image Credit: fisherynation.com

If this is alarming, the potential discrepancy between the volumes of West & Central Pacific swordfish declared for 2012 and those actually captured is even more so.

A common software audit platform would enable European Fisheries authorities to identify IUU fishing importation trends as well as to ascertain species under-declaration volumes – such IUU trade-flows could then be used as solid, objective data upon which the Commission could identify third countries for potential inclusion in the EU non-cooperating third country list.

Perhaps this could even be integrated with the public EU alert system once it is operational, so that awareness of IUU fishing trade flows and vessel data and activity could be integrated, shared and uniformly acted upon.

Footnotes:

[1] To access the full MRAG report, click here: http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/studies/iuu-regulation-application/doc/final-report_en.pdf

[2] This weakness was also highlighted in a 2013 report published in April by Sasama and FMP Consulting. To access, click here http://sasama.info/en/pdf/reports_17.pdf)

[3] http://www.undercurrentnews.com/2014/06/30/spain-seeks-eu-wide-suspension-of-vietnamese-swordfish-imports/

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European Policy on Illegal Fishing: Emergence of an International Trend?

Google Earth image featuring illegal fishing in European waters

Google Earth image featuring illegal fishing in European waters

Editor’s Note: This blog post was first published on http://iuufishing.ideasoneurope.eu on the 3rd of July 2014.

The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and the European Union (EU) have singled out illegal unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing as one of the main factors contributing to fishery depletion and a key obstacle to achieving sustainability.[1]

IUU fishing and overfishing have already affected the food security of vulnerable populations on land.[2]

At a time when fish has a growing importance in feeding the world, against a backdrop of our rapidly increasing human population, the environmental impacts of IUU fishing are a food security time bomb. This is made worse by the fact that pollution and climate change may also be undermining the ocean’s ability to produce food.

IUU fishing refers to fishing or fishing support activities performed in breach of fisheries management or conservation laws in national or international waters. It is a persistent phenomenon that thrives due to complex interactions.

IUU fishing is a complex problem, symptomatic of underlying factors that can also contribute to insecurity. Examples include a lack of distributive justice in resource access opportunities, inadequate and/or fragile legal and institutional frameworks, an absence of integrated monitoring, control and surveillance mechanisms and poor observance of the rule of law in maritime spaces.

For policies against IUU fishing to be successful, difficult problems such as the lack of governance accountability or the success of illegal global markets in wildlife and natural resources must be tackled.[3] The EU, current leader in the fight against IUU fishing, has developed a trade policy to address some of these issues.

In January 2010 the EU started to enforce a comprehensive system of port and market controls. By way of a pan-European law (Council Regulation 1005/2008 “the IUU Regulation”), the EU has devised a WTO-compatible methodology for detecting IUU fishing trade flows as well as identifying States that do not address the illegal fishing activities of their fleets.[4]

By engaging exporting States in a certification system that guarantees fish capture legality, the European Commission is able to identify exporting countries that allow IUU fishing trade flows to reach Europe. The Commission deals with this by working with such countries in the first instance, under a warning that failure to improve IUU fishing compliance controls may result in trade restrictions.

To date, the Commission has formally warned several countries, namely Panama, Fiji, Sri Lanka, Togo, Vanuatu, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Korea and Ghana. The European Council, following the Commission’s recommendation, has banned seafood imports from Guinea, Belize and Cambodia on IUU fishing concerns.[5]

The IUU Regulation also enables European governments to use port tools in the fight against IUU fishing. For example, it establishes a system of notifications and inspections for fishing vessels and refrigerated seafood cargo vessels. It has also established the foundations for the creation of an EU illegal vessel black list. Vessels that feature in this list are not able to access European ports for commercial purposes.

The fact that combatting IUU fishing is considered a priority in European policy is also exemplified by the recent publication of the Commission’s External Action Service ‘s Security Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea.[6] IUU fishing has been integrated in this document as a priority due to its impact on food security as well as its links with transnational organised crime.[7]

This is a policy trend with international echoes. It is unlikely to be coincidental that the African Union’s new strategy has this year been expanded to include IUU fishing. Further, in the United States, President Obama has recently announced the creation of a comprehensive framework to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud.[8]

There have also been international developments, with the UN Fisheries Committee (COFI) formally endorsing the Guidelines for Flag State Performance. This voluntary instrument sets out a common minimum due diligence standard for combatting IUU fishing. COFI has also assessed the ratification status of the Port State Measures Agreement, an agreement widely hailed as a vital legislative tool to prevent illegally obtained seafood from entering the ports of signatory nations.

IUU fishing is a global problem that requires the collective, sustained effort of governments as well as industry and civil society. Despite the challenges, the above policy developments demonstrate that there is a deepening understanding of IUU fishing and a growing will to address it.

[1] The IUU strategy of the European Union is set out in the DG Mare website. For more information, please see http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/maritime_affairs_and_fisheries/fisheries_resources_and_environment/l66052_en.htm

[2] See, for example, the Madagascar food security study carried out by Le Manach et al in 2012 concerning unreported fishing and stock decline.
[3]https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/4aenvironmental_crime_threatassessment_2013_-_public_version.pdf
[4] http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/illegal_fishing/index_en.htm
[5] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1215_en.htm
[6] http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140317_01_en.pdf
[7] https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/2011/issue-paper-transnational-organized-crime-in-the-fishing-industry.html
[8] Full press release: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/17/presidential-memorandum-comprehensive-framework-combat-illegal-unreporte

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What is IUU Fishing?

Post published by the House of Ocean on the 24th June 2014 on http://iuufishing.ideasoneurope.eu 

Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a major global fisheries problem. It has undesirable effects on fish stock survival, the marine environment and on human populations. 

Illegal Trawling in the Canary Islands (Google Earth)

Illegal Trawling in the Canary Islands (Google Earth)

IUU fishing results from the failure of States to monitor the fishing activity of their vessels and to enforce laws and regulations. Because of its furtive nature, IUU fishing undermines measures to manage fisheries sustainably, directly affecting law-abiding fisheries actors that compete for the same stock whilst bearing more of the regulatory and financial burden.

A cause of food and work insecurity in vulnerable coastal nations, IUU fishing also distorts competition as fishing operators who avoid compliance with laws and regulations gain competitive advantage. It reduces fishing opportunities for law-abiding operators, putting lawful fisheries at risk.

IUU fishing has been linked to crime at sea, including the trafficking of human beings, protected wildlife, weapons and drugs.

Typical IUU fishing behaviours include fishing without a valid licence, not recording or communicating catch data, fishing in restricted areas, targeting unauthorised species, using banned gear, falsifying or concealing the vessel’s identity or itinerary, obstructing the work of inspectors or enforcers, targeting undersized fish, engaging in unauthorised transhipments, participating in fishing or fisheries support activities with vessels in an IUU black list or  operating in breach of the conservation and management measures of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations.

The European Commission has judged the situation to be sufficiently serious as to put in place systems whereby States that do not put measures in place to address IUU fishing are identified. The European Union has now formally warned Vanuatu, Fiji, Panama, Sri Lanka, Togo, Korea, Ghana, Curacao, Philippines, and Papua New Guinea. Upon the Commission’s recommendation, The European Council took the decision earlier this year to ban seafood imports from Guinea, Belize and Cambodia, who are considered by the EU to be condoning IUU fishing.

The furtive nature of IUU fishing means that its true scale is difficult to calculate, though a 2009 study by Agnew D.J. and others suggests annual costs of between US $ 10 and 23.5 Billion. Around one-fifth of global marine captures is thought to be illegal in origin.